SOME FACETS OF PAULINE ANTHROPOLOGY – HOW WOULD A GRECO-ROMAN READER UNDERSTAND IT?

Preliminary Remark: Pauline Anthropology in Its Contexts

Anthropological issues within Pauline writings occur mostly in the context of ethics, sometimes in contexts of protology and eschatology.[1] In most of the books on Pauline theology, ethics are discussed after the description of ecclesiology. The individual Christian participates in the holiness of the community. This is both an honour and an obligation.

An attempted contribution on Pauline anthropology risks being either a mere repetition of well-known issues or a mystifying or oversophisticated sermon of the sort which Paul would only answer with his own words: τὶ οὖν ἐροῦμεν πρὸς ταῦτα!? I can only try here to show how some anthropological notions within the Pauline writings rule out any progress in Christian ethical behaviour. Therefore some well-known facts are only briefly mentioned. Other questions are not yet answered, e.g., the question raised by Heikki Räisänen:[2] Why is it possible for the Christian to do what was impossible for humankind before Christ, namely, to fulfil God's will?

1. The Jewish Background of Paul's Thinking

There is a consensus that in his anthropological discourse Paul mostly uses Biblical and early Jewish categories and in only a few cases philosophical Hellenistic categories. One example of this is the wording of ἔσω ἄνθρωπος[3], another one the concept of conscience.

[1] According to C. Hoegen-Rohls, the Christians as καινὴ κτίσις "are typological representations of the new end-time project that God has in mind". C. HOEGEN-ROHLS, *κτίσις and καινὴ κτίσις in Paul's Letters*, in A. CHRISTOPHERSEN et al. (eds.), *Paul, Luke and the Graeco-Roman World, Festschrift A. Wedderburn* (JSNTSup, 217), London et al., Sheffield Academic Press, 2002, pp. 102-122, p. 121. 1 Cor 15,35-49 argues against a *reductio ad absurdum* which on the basis of the questions named in v. 35 intends to mark the notion of resurrection in general as ridiculous and to justify the lifestyle quoted above in 1 Cor 15,32: "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die."

[2] H. RÄISÄNEN, *Paul and the Law*, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2nd ed., 1987, pp. 199-200.

[3] Cf. TH. K. HECKEL, *Der innere Mensch. Die paulinische Verarbeitung eines platonischen Motivs* (WUNT, II.53), Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1993; H.D. BETZ, *The Concept of "Inner Human Being" in Paul's Anthropology*, in *NTS* 46 (2000) 315-341.

Greek philosophy had formulated complex theories of deciding and doing. Nothing of these reflections occurs in Paul. Philosophical terms like διαίρεσις (distinguishing) or κατάληψις (apprehension) or ἡγεμονικόν are missing in the Pauline writings; προαιρέομαι in 2 Cor 9,7 can be understood in the general sense of "free decision" but it is not integrated into an anthropological theory. Even in 1 Thess 5,23 it is doubtful whether Paul has a trichotomic anthropology in mind or not.[4] Paul does not use the words ψυχή and πνεῦμα in a philosophical sense but ψυχή normally means the Hebrew נפש. Similarly, πνεῦμα in Paul's writings is not the Stoic πνεῦμα understood as the material of the soul.[5] In Rom 6,6, Paul combines the terms ὁ πάλαιος ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος, our σῶμα and ἡμεῖς to demonstrate the necessity of our death for sin: "We know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin". No student of Greek philosophy would have been allowed to formulate that in this way. From a Greco-Roman point of view, Paul's reference to the enslaving character of sin is formulated in a misleading way. It is not an abstract power of sin but the very real emotions which put humans in slavery.[6] Perhaps Paul had not been able to decide between Zeno's evaluation of the πάθη as a consequence of a wrong rational judgement[7] and Chrysippus' interpretation of it as a judgement in itself.[8] According to Jerome, Tit 1,12, Acts 17,28 and 1 Cor 15,33 prove that Paul was also educated in the wisdom of this world – *licet non ad perfectum.*[9] For a Greco-Roman reader this comment is the very truth.

[4] T. HOLTZ, *Der erste Brief an die Thessalonicher* (EKKNT, 13), Zürich et al., Neukirchener Verlag, 1986, pp. 264-265, discusses a trichotomic anthropology in 1 Thess 5,23; U. SCHNELLE, *Neutestamentliche Anthropologie. Jesus – Paulus – Johannes*, Neukirchen, Neukirchener Verlag, 1991, p. 123, has voted against it. Another issue is the theory that the immortal kind of soul was planted in the head, the kind of mortal soul in the chest, and that part of the soul which is subject to appetites for foods and drinks in the parts midway between the midriff and the boundary at the navel, cf. PLATO, *Tim.* 69 A-70 D (PLATO, *Timaeus*, in *Plato in 12 Volumes*, vol. 9, with an English Translation, ed. R.G. BURY, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1929 = 1966, 16-253, pp. 178-182). Paul probably did not know this theory.

[5] A. DIHLE, *ψυχή κτλ.*, TWNT 9 (1973), pp. 604-614, esp. 610.

[6] *Epict Diss* 4,1,7ff (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments*, ed. W.A. OLDFATHER, vol. 2, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1928 = 1966, 246ff).

[7] SVF 1, 209 (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* collegit Ioannes AB ARNIM, vol. 1, Leipzig 1905 = Stuttgart, Teubner 1964, p. 51).

[8] SVF 3, 462 (*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* collegit Ioannes AB ARNIM, vol. 3, Leipzig 1903 = Stuttgart, Teubner 1964, p. 115).

[9] HIERONYMUS, *Commentariorum in Epistolam ad Galatas libri 3*, ed. G. RASPANTI (CC SL, 77A), Turnhout, Brepols, 2006, p. 139.

In early Judaism, the willingness to pick up Greek philosophical terms for anthropology varies. Within the LXX, only few references are to be mentioned: Psalms,[10] Ecclesiastes,[11] and Jesus Sirach.[12] Yet the influence of philosophical terms and ideas on Philo's theology and 4 Maccabees is well known.[13] So we have to conclude: Paul the apostle of the Gentiles did not realize his strategy "to become τοῖς ἄνομοις ἄνομος" (1 Cor 9,21) by engaging in philosophical debate.[14] He is not really interested in a cohesive anthropology according to Greek philosophical norms. His theoretical issues in this field are to be seen in terms of early Jewish haggadic freedom within a strictly fixed frame. In early Judaism this frame is the monotheistic confession and the fulfilling of the Torah, whereas Paul formulates the idea of fulfilling the will of God perfectly in general and uses semantically open wordings like "to walk adequately to the call of God" (1 Thess 2,12); "the obedience which leads to righteousness" (Rom 6,16); "to bring fruit for God" (Rom 7,4); "to live for God" (Gal 2,19) etc.

To be sure, within an author-centred approach it is more fruitful to compare Paul's ethics with popular ethics than with the ethics of a specific philosophical school,[15] and this is probably true for anthropological

[10] Ps 50,14 LXX (πνεύματι ἡγεμονικῷ στήρισόν με) read in a philosophical sense means that the divine πνεῦμα should control my desires of the θυμοειδές and of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, cf. *Plato Rep.* 4,439D-440E (PLATO, *The Republic,* in *Plato in 12 Volumes*, Vol. 5, with an English Translation, ed. P. SHOREY, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1930 = 1969, 396-404). The νοῦς is the κυβερνήτης of ψυχή, *Plato Phaedr* 247 C (PLATO, *Phaedrus,* in *Plato in 12 Volumes*, Vol. 1, with an English Translation, ed. H.N. FOWLER, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1914 = 1971, pp. 405-579, esp. 476.

[11] The word προαίρεσις occurs often in Eccles, for רעות or for רעץ, and is combined mostly with the term πνεῦμα to the syntagma προαίρεσις πνεύματος More philosophically it would have been formulated προαίρεσις τοῦ νοός.

[12] In Sir 3,24 LXX we read: πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐπλάνησεν ἡ ὑπόληψις αὐτῶν, καὶ ὑπόνοια πονηρὰ ὠλίσθησεν διανοίας αὐτῶν. But there is no cohesive theory concerning the relation between ὑπόληψις and the other philosophical terms of moral decision.

[13] In 4 Macc. the term πνεῦμα is missing but the term νοῦς is often used.

[14] How was it possible that Christian thinkers of later times integrated Greek philosophy in the well-known extensive way? We have to refer to common themes like cosmogony and ethics, common doctrines like the ideal of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ (cf. Gen 1,26 with *Plato Theat.* 176B [PLATO, *Theatetus,* in *Plato in 12 Volumes*, Vol. 7, with an English Translation, ed. H.N. FOWLER, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, London, William Heinemann, 1921 = 1967, pp. 1-257, p. 106]), forbidding of desire, terminological neutrality over against the important (!) philosophical schools by using semantically open wordings.

[15] D. ZELLER, *Konkrete Ethik im hellenistischen Kontext*, in J. BEUTLER (ed.), *Der neue Mensch in Christus. Hellenistische Anthropologie und Ethik im Neuen Testament* (Quaestiones Disputatae, 190), Freiburg, Herder, 2001, pp. 82-98, esp. 84-85. *Ibid.*, p. 98: "Berührungen ... erfolgten nicht auf technischem Niveau".

problems as well. But if we use a reader-centred approach we can ask how a philosophically educated member of Greco-Roman society could have described Pauline anthropology.[16] A philosopher like Marcus Aurelius evaluated Christian readiness to martyrdom as sign of stubbornness[17] whereas for a philosopher like the pre-Christian Justin Martyr this readiness testified Christian innocence.[18] So this study is also a contribution concerning the impression Christianity made on non-Christian Greco-Romans. Within a Greco-Roman setting, the Jesus movement could appear as a mixture of θίασος[19] and philosophical school[20], as a θίασος centered on one or two gods and a philosophical school with its own ethics. To be sure we should not overestimate how widespread philosophical thoughts were in ancient society, but for everyone who really understood the consequences of becoming a Christian a general nearness to the claim of philosophical ethics to govern the whole of life was at hand.[21] Further, we must admit that authors like Tacitus, Suetonius, Pliny, and Marcus Aurelius did not understand Christianity in the way it is described in this study. But other authors like Galen see a coincidence

[16] Which specific Pauline motives were known to ancient critics of Christianity? In general, we must have in mind that these critics often did not distinguish Pauline from non-Pauline motives. But for the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Paul beyond the borders of Christianity we have to note the following (possible) occurrences: According to Celsus (cf. *Origen Cont Cels* 5,64; ORIGENES, *Contre Celse*, Introd., texte critique, trad. et notes par M. BORRET, vol. 3 (SC, 147), Paris, Cerf, 1969, p. 172) the distance from the world as it is expressed in Gal 6,14 is a common characteristic for all Christian groups. Minucius Felix refers to election *sola gratia* and bodily resurrection as topics of pagan criticism (MINUCIUS FELIX, *Octavius*, 11,6-7, ed. B. KYTZLER, *Bibliotheca scriptorium Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*, Stuttgart / Leipzig, Teubner, 1992, p. 9); Porphyry hints e.g. at the contradiction between Gal 3,10 and Rom 7,12, cf. *Porph Frgm* 30 (PORPHYRUS, *Fragmente*, ed. A. v. HARNACK, Porphyrius, "Gegen die Christen", 15 Bücher, Zeugnisse, Fragmente und Referate, Abhandlungen der königl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse 1 [AAB, 1916,1], Berlin, Verlag der königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften / in Kommission bei Georg Reimer, 1916, p. 59).

[17] *Marcus Aurelius Ad se ipsum* 11,3 (MARCUS AURELIUS, *The Communings with Himself. A Revised Text and a Translation into English*, ed. C.R. HAINES, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1916 = 1970, p. 294).

[18] *Justin 2 Apol* 12,1 (*Iustini Martyis Apologiae pro Christianis*, ed. M. Marcovich [Patristische Texte und Studien, 38] Berlin, New York, de Gruyter 1994, p. 155).

[19] Cf. *Lucian of Samosata Peregrinus Proteus* 11 (LUCIAN, *The Passing of Peregrinus*, in *Lucian in Eight Volumes* [LCL], Vol. 5, with an English Translation by A.M. HARMON, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, London, William Heinemann, 1936 = 1962, pp. 1-51, p. 12). Peregrinus is named a θιασάρχης.

[20] Cf. T. SCHMELLER, *Gegenwelten. Zum Vergleich zwischen paulinischen Gemeinden und nichtchristlichen Gruppen*, in *BZ.NF* 47 (2003) 167-185, pp. 176-83.

[21] Cf. T. ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, *Paul and the Stoics*, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 2000, pp. 33-40.

between Christianity and moral philosophy at the level of the particular maxims however different the theoretical foundation.[22] Teaching on cosmogony and ethical behavior are common topics, and sometimes the Christian terminology of conversion also occurs in philosophical προτρεπτικοί[23]. Therefore we can ask: How would a Greco-Roman reader understand what Paul wrote on anthropological topics? But we also have to ask what he would feel was missing.

2. Observations on Terminology

2.1. Human Being

The term ἄνθρωπος mostly designates human being as distinguished from God as just human, restricted, erring and sinful. Our behaviour should be oriented to God and not to humans (Gal 1,10). Κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν is unwise (1 Cor 3,3s). According to Rom 6,6, our old ἄνθρωπος is to die, and the καινὴ κτίσις (2 Cor 5,17) is to be realised in the newness of our living (Rom 6,4).Yet the proclamation of the Gospel implies the obligation to recommend oneself to the "conscience of everyone" (2 Cor 4,2); and the wording ἔσω ἄνθρωπος (Rom 7,22; 2 Cor 4,16) presupposes a positive nuance: According to Rom 7,22, the human being before Christ can delight in the law of God in the inmost self, and in 2 Cor 4,16 Paul distinguishes between outward distress and his orientation to eternity by this designation. The term ἄνθρωπος implies a rational entity distinguished from the beasts who is capable of reflecting on itself and of being called by God.

The term ἄνθρωπος is a general term: Questions of age and youth do not arise. Paul deals with the adult man and woman who are able to reflect on their own deeds. The terminology of parenthood and childhood serves as a metaphor for the love between the apostle and his pupils (Philem 10) and congregations (2 Cor 12,14), and it serves as a metaphor

[22] Christian authors called Christianity a "divine sect ... better philosophy", cf. TERTULLIAN, *De pallio* 6,2, ed. A. GERLO (CC SL, 2), Turnhout, Brepols, 1954, pp. 731-750, esp. 750. Tertullian exaggerates in claiming for Christianity a higher intellectual level, but the comparison is not totally wrong.

[23] For the term ἐπιστρέφειν meaning conversion cf. *Epict Diss* 2,20,22 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. W.A. OLDFATHER, Vol. 1, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1925 = 1967, p. 376); the distance from the former way of life is expressed in *Epict Diss.* 4,2,1 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER, vol. 2 [n. 6], p. 304-306), as well as in 1 Pet 4,2.

for imperfectness (1 Cor 13,11)[24] causing pain (Gal 4,19) and sometimes to be vituperated (1 Cor 3,1) and corrected (1 Cor 4,14s), but it does not constitute an anthropological theme. Rom 7,9 is no reflection on the innocence of children.

Death is a reality in this world since Adam (cf. 1 Cor 15,21: δι' ἀνθρώπου θάνατος). This is a roll-back-exegesis of Gen 3,19: If God predicts death as punishment for Adam's sin, the original conception of human being was another, namely immortality.[25] The connection between sin and death is unknown to Greco-Roman readers; even in the myths of a golden age humans are mortal. For a Greco-Roman reader Christian belief in immortality was a superstitious over-estimation of individual worth.[26] In my eyes the Corinthians who denied the resurrection (1 Cor 15,12) were arguing from a Hellenistic point of view.[27]

2.2. Flesh, Body, and Belly

I only repeat well-known facts: all these terms are mostly used negatively within the Pauline writings, and the desires, the ἐπιθυμίαι can be named both as the desires of the flesh (Gal 5,16) and as the desires of the body (Rom 6,12). The first wording underlines the wrong orientation of these desires; the second wording marks their starting point.

Each of these terms has its own characteristics. The belly is the region of the body with which the desires of eating, drinking and sex[28] are associated. K.O. Sandnes has shown that Paul's polemics against those whose bellies are their God (Phil 3,19; Rom 16,18) is not directed against

[24] Childhood serves as a metaphor not only in the issue of individual growth but also in the issue of salvation history, cf. Gal 4,1.3.

[25] There is a broad discussion on this topic in the early Jewish literature which I can only mention at this point.

[26] Cf. *Lucian Peregrinus* 13, ed. HARMON (n. 19), p. 14. For the philosophical background see below.

[27] Cf. A. ROBERTSON – A. PLUMMER, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (ICC), Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1986, p. 347. They refer to *Aeschylos Eum.* 647s (AESCHYLOS, *Eumenides*, in *Aeschylus in Two Volumes*, with an English Translation by H.W. SMYTH, Vol. 2, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1926 = 1963, pp. 269-371, p. 334s). Aeschylos makes Apollo say: "when the dust hath drained the blood of man, once he is slain, there is no return to life"; cf. *Plato Phaidon* 70 A (PLATO, *Phaidon*, ed. FOWLER [n. 10], pp. 193-403, esp. 240-242). There Cebes cites the general Greek scepticism concerning the belief in the immortality of the soul.

[28] Concerning κοιλία for the sexual desire, see Sir 23,6 LXX.

Jewish Christian observance of the Jewish food laws[29] but to be understood against the background of the issue of mastering the desires in moral philosophy, specifically in polemics against a lifestyle wrongly attributed to Epicurus.[30]

The term "flesh" designs human beings as ill (Gal 4,14) and weak (Rom 6,19) and mortal (2 Cor 4,11) and therefore distinct from a superior realm or mode of being (Gal 1,16), but it also has moral connotations. Flesh is the sphere of the operations of sin (Rom 7,5.18), it is the wrong point of orientation opposed to the Holy Spirit (Gal 5,19-23; Rom 8,6) and therefore hostile toward God (Rom 8,7). In Paul's Bible, the term "flesh" designs the semantic opposition of humans and God, but not always in a negative way: cf. Ps 83,3b LXX ἡ καρδία μου καὶ ἡ σάρξ μου ἠγαλλιάσαντο ἐπὶ θεὸν ζῶντα. The negative nuance of σάρξ within the Pauline writings has its parallels in a few Greek texts.[31] But there are parallels also in Qumran, e.g., in 1QH 12,29: What is flesh compared to the manifestation of God's glory, "if man is in sin from his maternal womb"?, or in 4Q416 c. 1 and 4Q418 Frgm. 81, in the admonition to the pupil to keep away from the "spirit of flesh".[32]

"Body" within Pauline writings does not usually[33] designate one of the three parts of human beings, but the human being as a creature[34] and individual women or men as active human beings (2 Cor 5,10; Rom 6,6), who are not monads but stand with one another in mutual communicative relations.[35] James D.G. Dunn reminds us of some Greek parallels in which

[29] G.F. HAWTHORNE, *Philippians* (WBC, 43), Waco, TX, Word, 1983, p. 166, and others; cf. in early times THEODORET OF CYRUS, *In Phil.* (PG, 82, pp. 557B–590D; esp. 584 B); PS.-JEROME, *in Phil.* (PL 30, 841A – 852D; esp. 850 A).

[30] K.O. SANDNES, *Belly and Body* (SNTS.MS, 120), Cambridge, 2002, pp. 35-78; as a possible interpretation mentioned also by Ps.-Jerome, *in Phil.* (PL 30, 850 AB).

[31] Cf. A. SAND, *Der Begriff "Fleisch" in den paulinischen Hauptbriefen* (Biblische Untersuchungen, 2), Regensburg, Pustet, 1967, pp. 239-242. *Ibid.*, p. 242, the author also stresses the differences between Greek philosophy and Paul: there is no tendency in Greek philosophy to understand the human being generally by the term σάρξ.

[32] Cf. J. FREY, *Die paulinische Antithese von "Fleisch" und "Geist" und die palästinisch-jüdische Weisheitstradition*, in *ZNW* 90 (1999) 45-77, esp. 54-63.

[33] For an overview, see J.D.G. DUNN, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*, Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans Publishing, 1998; London, New York, Continuum, ²2003, pp. 55-61.

[34] G. SELLIN, *Hauptprobleme des Ersten Korintherbriefes*, ANRW II 25,4 (1987) 2940-3044, esp. 3007.

[35] E. KÄSEMANN, *Zum Thema der urchristlichen Apokalyptik*, in KÄSEMANN, *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen* II, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964, p. 129; G. SELLIN, *Leiblichkeit als Grundkategorie paulinischer Ethik*, in C. BÖTTRICH (ed.), *Eschatologie und Ethik im frühen Christentum, Festschrift G. Haufe* (Greifswalder theologische Forschungen, 11), Frankfurt (Main) u.a., Peter Lang, 2006, pp. 329-338, esp. 338.

σῶμα "can stand for the whole person or function in effect as a reflexive pronoun".[36] The negative connotations occurring within the Pauline letters are easily to be understood in terms of moral philosophy, but the word body is used in a neutral way in 1 Cor 6,19 and Rom 12,1, "denoting completeness of commitment".[37] I shall return to this point later.

How should we describe the distinction between the words "body" and "flesh"? It is clearly correct to register the more neutral spectrum of meaning for σῶμα and the more negative one for σάρξ[38] and the combination of Hebrew and Greek concepts.[39] In addition to this, the word "flesh" functions as a cipher for the fact that sins are not only sins of the body but of our wrong emotions and our wrong thinking (Gal 5,19-21).[40]

Perhaps the Greek distinction between body and soul is not in general unknown to Paul. According to N. Walter, Paul in 2 Cor 5,1-10 revises his eschatology with regard to the Corinthian position: The term σῶμα πνευματικόν (1 Cor 15,44.46) does not occur anywhere else in the New Testament.[41] J. Lambrecht adds the insight that the term σῶμα only refers to our body during our lifetime on earth (2 Cor 5,6.8.10).[42] Concerning 2 Cor 4,16, Thrall has stressed "that Paul at times made more of a distinction between body and spirit than is sometimes allowed".[43] Yet, Paul did not develop this distinction in order to create a basis for a new anthropology in Romans or Philippians.

[36] DUNN, *Theology of Paul the Apostle* (n. 33), p. 55.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[38] Paul could not have formulated 1 Cor 6,19 by the wording δοξάσατε δὴ τὸν θεὸν ἐν (= instr. בְּ) τῇ σαρκὶ ὑμῶν or 1 Cor 15,44 by the wording σάρξ πνευματική.

[39] DUNN, *Theology of Paul the Apostle*, (n. 33), p. 71.

[40] Patristic exegesis of Gal 5,19-21, referring to that point in the context of antignostic and antimanicheic polemics, is not wrong at all, cf. *Epiphanius von Salamis haer.* 66,86,3 (GCS 37,129); *Johannes Chrysostomus comm. in Gal.* (PG 61,673): Gal 5,19-21 implies also vices of the soul.

[41] N. WALTER, *Leibliche Auferstehung? Zur Frage der Hellenisierung der Auferweckungshoffnung bei Paulus*, in M. TROWITZSCH (ed.), *Paulus, Apostel Jesu Christi, Festschrift G. Klein*, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1998, pp. 109-127, esp. 126-127.

[42] J. LAMBRECHT, *Brief Anthropological Reflections on 2 Cor 4,6–5,10*, in J. BURKE TREVOR – J. K. ELLIOTT (eds.), *Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict, In Honour of M. Thrall* (NTSup, 109), Leiden, Brill, 2003, pp. 259-266.

[43] M. THRALL, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians I* (ICC), Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1994, p. 349. In 1 Cor 15 Paul can use the word "body" in order to design the earthly but also the heavenly existence (See U. SCHNELLE, *Der erste Thessalonicherbrief und die Entstehung der paulinischen Anthropologie*, in *NTS* 32 (1986) 209-224, esp. 215). In 2 Cor the breadth of use of the term "body" is reduced. Probably this reduction is to be connected with another fact: In 2 Cor Paul reflects on the possibility of his own individual death, perhaps – this is disputed controversially – caused by the incident mentioned in 2 Cor 1,8-10.

2.3. The Holy Spirit, God's Spirit within Ourselves, the Heart, the Human Mind, and the Conscience

Stoic philosophers used the term πνεῦμα to name the ethereal material of the soul;[44] Paul did not. If a Greco-Roman reader realized that Paul did not follow the Stoic use of this term then he could understand that this term πνεῦμα designs a reality outside ourselves stemming from God and equally a reality within ourselves, whose relation to our νοῦς is to be disputed.[45] But if he had asked Paul to describe this relation more precisely, Paul could not have pointed to a *locus classicus* within his writings. Only by combination we can describe this relation of the Holy Spirit, God's spirit within ourselves and our mind. My thesis is as follows: The Holy Spirit is the source for knowledge of God's will and the source of the ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοός (Rom 12,2).[46] God's Spirit in us testifies to God's will in our heart. Our heart is the centre of emotions and the starting point of intellectual activity, our mind is the authority to extract the consequences from the knowledge of God meant above, and conscience is the authority which in retrospect proves the deed, whether really done or only planned.

2.3.1. The Holy Spirit

In my view, the following features of the Pauline concept of the Holy Spirit can be found in Qumran: the covenant between God and his people as the basic foundation,[47] knowledge of God,[48] enabling to do what is right,[49] consequences in ethics.[50] Likewise, a parallel to the idea that

[44] See n. 5. – The study of the ancient medical literature offers some fruitful insights, cf. T.W. MARTIN, *Paul's Pneumatological Statements and Ancient Medical Texts* in *The New Testament and Early Christian Literature in Greco-Roman Context, Studies in honor of D. E. Aune* (NTSup, 122), Leiden 2006, pp. 105-126, esp. 114-116.

[45] *Origen Comm. Rom.* Frgm. 48 Ramsbotham (ORIGENES, *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* / Römerbrief, übersetzt und eingeleitet von TH. HEITHER, Bd. 6 [FC 2.6] Freiburg u.a., Herder, 1999, p. 212) seems to identify both issues in commenting on Rom 8,26f with the phrase "our mind follows the Holy Spirit our adviser". In Rufin's translation *Orig Comm Rom* 7,6 (ORIGENES, *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos Comm. in Rom.* 7,6 [FC 2.4], ed. TH. HEITHER, Freiburg u.a., Herder, 1994, p. 80) this identification is made explicit. I think it is not correct.

[46] H. KLEIN, *Gottes Wille im Corpus Paulinum als Ansatzpunkt paulinischer Ethik*, in BÖTTRICH (ed.), *Eschatologie und Ethik* (n. 35), pp. 133-148, esp. 143.

[47] 4Q509 Frg. 97+98 c. i.

[48] 1QH 4,17; 11,22; 20,11f.; 4Q504 Frg. 4,5; 4Q506 Frg. 131+132,11.

[49] 1QH 8,6.11f.; 12,31; 15,6f.; 1QS 3,6; 4,20.

[50] CD 7,3; 4Q258 Frg. 2 c. ii 4.

humankind was unable to do God's will before Christ but able to do it under him is found in Qumran, 1QH 12,29-32:

> He is in sin from his maternal womb, and in guilty iniquity right to old age. But I know that justice does not belong to man nor the perfect path to the son of man. To God Most High belong all the acts of justice, and the path of man is not secure except by the spirit which God creates for him to perfect the path of the sons of man so that all his creatures come to know the strength of his power and the extent of his compassion with all the sons of his approval.

Another parallel is Wis 9,17:

> Who has learned your counsel, unless you have given wisdom and sent your holy spirit from on high?

The background for these is probably Ezek 36,26-27:

> A new heart I will give you, and a new spirit I will put within you; and I will remove from your body the heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. I will put my spirit within you, and make you follow my statutes and be careful to observe my ordinances.

Admittedly, Paul does not quote Ezek 36,26s or Jer 31,31-34 or Joel 2,28s at all,[51] and the theory of some exegetes declaring Ezek 36,26s to be the background for Rom 8 remains speculative, but I do not see any alternative.

A Hellenistic reader of Paul could associate some aspects of συνείδησις[52] or could compare the Christian concepts of angels.[53] But perhaps he would also remember some functions of the Socratic δαιμόνιον understood in a distinct way.

[51] According to S. KIM, *Paul and the New Perspective: Second Thoughts on the Origin of Paul's Gospel*, Grand Rapids, MI, Cambridge U.K., Eerdmans, 2002, p. 158, there is an allusion in 2 Cor 3,3 to Ezek 36,26s. J.D.G. DUNN, *The Theology of Paul's Letter to the Galatians*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 107, proposes the thesis that "Paul was claiming in effect that the inner, spontaneous knowledge of God's will, for which Jeremiah had looked as a feature of the New Covenant (Jer 31,31-34), was now reality in the experience of those who had received the Spirit".

[52] U. SCHNELLE, *Paulus. Leben und Denken*, Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2003, p. 607, referring to *Epict Diss* 1,4,12 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER, vol. 1 [n. 23], p. 30).

[53] *Augustin Civ.* 9,19-22 (SAINT AUGUSTINE, *The City of God against the Pagans in Seven Volumes*, Vol. 3, with an English Translation by D.S. WIESEN [LCL] London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 226-236) compares the thoroughly evil demons with the good angels who claim veneration not for themselves but for God himself.

It is not possible to unfold the very rich Greek and Latin literature on the δαιμόνιον of Socrates at this point, and I do not maintain that the Hellenistic reader would understand Paul very well by associating the δαιμόνιον with him, but to describe Paul's concept is one thing, to describe the possible history of reception is another.

Only a few remarks must suffice. According to Plato, the δαιμόνιον of Socrates was an inner voice restraining him from doing wrong but not motivating him to do something good.[54] According to Xenophon, the δαιμόνιον also acts positively,[55] and later authors like Plutarch,[56] Dio Chrysostom[57] and Apuleius follow this line. In their eyes, this δαιμόνιον was not only active in questions of ethical decision. According to Apuleius, the δαιμόνιον of Socrates, if venerated in the right way, is[58] *In rebus incertis prospector, dubiis praemonitor, periculosis tutator, egenis opitulator.*

Dio Chrysostom sometimes refers to the general view that every man follows his δαίμων to do good or bad deeds according to the good or bad nature of the δαίμων[59]. That is the popular belief. But Dio also knows the Stoic concept of δαίμων as only good. Humans have a free will either to follow this good δαίμων or not to follow.[60] According to Poseidonius, the reason for emotions is the human failure to follow the δαίμων within them that is cognate to the δαίμων ruling all the world.[61] Similarly, the academic Plutarch is convinced: "the power of the good demon is able

[54] *Plato Apol.* 31D; 40A (PLATO, *The Apology*, ed. FOWLER [n. 10], pp. 61-145, esp. 114.138); *Plato Phaedr.* 242BC (PLATO, *Phaedrus*, ed. FOWLER [n. 10], pp. 405-579, esp. 458).

[55] *Xen Mem* 1,4,15; 4,8,1 (XENOPHON, *Memorabilia*, ed. J.R. SMITH, 1903 = New York, Arno Press 1979, pp. 56.248).

[56] *Plut Socrat* 580 CD (PLUTARCH, *De genio Socratis*, in *Plutarch's Moralia in 15 Volumes*, Vol. 7, with an English Translation by PH. H. DE LACY – B. EINARSON, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. 361-509, esp. 404).

[57] *Dio Chrysostom Or.* 23,11-12 (*Dio Chrysostom in Five Volumes*, Vol. 2, with an English Translation by J.W. COHOON, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 1950, p. 312).

[58] *Apuleius De deo Socratis* 16, 156 (APULEIUS, *De deo Socratis / Über den Gott des Sokrates*, ed. M. BALTHES et al., [Scripta Antiquitatis Posterioris ad Ethicam Religionemque pertinentia, 7], Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004, p. 74).

[59] *Dio Chrys Or.* 25,9 (*Dio Chrysostom in Five Volumes*, ed. COHOON [n. 57], p. 334).

[60] *Dio Chrys Or.* 23,11-12.

[61] POSEIDONIUS, in GALEN, *De Hippocratis et Platonis decretis* 5,6, ed. C.G. KÜHN, *Claudii Galeni opera omnia, vol. 5*, Leipzig 1823 = Hildesheim, Olms 1965, pp. 211-805, here p. 469.

to save (σῴζειν) the soul if she is willing to hear; but if she pays no heed, she is forsaken by her demon and comes to no happy end".[62] A reader of these remarks could draw parallels to the Pauline double concept of the Holy Spirit and the Spirit in us.

To be sure, the word δαιμόνιον is avoided in Paul's letters according to early Jewish custom of avoiding any nearness to pagan beliefs. Yet parallels to the Pauline view of the Holy Spirit are given in the influence of this power on ethics,[63] in its status as an external power[64] and in its goodness.[65] The term ἄγειν occurs, too. Explaining the relation of this demon to the human mind Plutarch writes, "it cannot be hard to believe that the understanding may be guided by a higher understanding... thought to thought, just as light produces a reflection".[66] The model "thought for thought" has also its parallel in the Pauline writings; cf. Rom 8,16: "When we cry, 'Abba! Father!'[16] it is that very Spirit bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God". Both, Holy Spirit and δαιμόνιον have partly an analogous function. Both conceptualize that human beings are morally guided in situations in which they have no guarantee of being able to do what is right.

But the differences should not to be overseen, either. The Holy Spirit is not active in non-spiritual matters. Further, Xenophon and Plutarch declare it to be an exception that the goddess influenced Socrates in particular in this way,[67] but according to Paul the Holy Spirit is a common gift for all Christians, and the call to ethical behavior is also directed to the whole Christian community. According to Apuleius, the demons are afflicted by emotions and therefore they are to be distinguished from the gods.[68] The parallels mentioned above are only certain parallels of function.

2.3.2. God's Spirit within Ourselves.

God's Spirit in ourselves is a gift from God (1 Thess 4,8; 1 Cor 2,12). According to Rom 8,16, it is the receiver of the activity of the Holy

[62] *Plut Socrat* 594A, (PLUTARCH, *De genio Socratis*, eds. DE LACY – EINARSON [n. 56], p. 482-484).

[63] *Ibid.*, 580CD; *Dio Chrys Or* 23,11f. (DIO CHRYSOSTOM, *Orationes*, ed. COHOON [n. 57], p. 312-314).

[64] *Dio Chrys Or* 25,1 (DIO CHRYSOSTOM, *Orationes*, ed. COHOON [n. 57], p. 324).

[65] *Dio Chrys Or* 23,11.

[66] *Plut Socrat* 589B (PLUTARCH, *De genio Socratis*, eds. DE LACY – EINARSON [n. 56], p. 454).

[67] *Xen Mem* 4,3,12 (XENOPHON, *Memorabilia*, ed. SMITH [n. 55], p. 220); *Plut Socrat* 593CD (PLUTARCH, *De genio Socratis*, eds. DE LACY – EINARSON [n. 56], p. 480.

[68] *Apul Socrat* 13/147 (APULEIUS, *De deo Socratis*, ed. BALTHES [n. 55], p. 68).

Spirit: "the very Spirit bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God." Yet there are other functions to be named; cf. Rom 8,9: "But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you". God's Spirit in ourselves testifies the norms implying that we should live according to the Spirit and not according to the flesh (Rom 8,5). Likewise, our thinking (φρόνημα) should be a thinking according to the Spirit (cf. Rom 8,6).

The mode of function of the Holy Spirit within ourselves is described by Paul using the verb ἄγειν Gal 5,18; Rom 8,14. The verb ἄγεσθαι, to be led, "implies the sense of being constrained by a compelling inner force, or of surrendering to a powerful inner compulsion".[69] In Plato's writings, ἄγειν sometimes designates the effects of the πάθη on our self; in Plutarch's writings ἄγειν sometimes describes the working of νοῦς on the soul and the body.[70]

According to 1 Cor 6,19, our σῶμα is a ναὸς τοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν ἁγίου πνεύματος. Here Paul declares the Holy Spirit in ourselves as an endangered area, endangered by sin. Again the same concept occurs both in Qumran[71] and in the writings of Epictetus.[72] The crucial point of this theory can be described as follows: The true Spirit as a divine entity can not be endangered in its own effectiveness, but our Holy Spirit, though given by God, can be endangered or even lost.

2.3.3. The Human Heart

The heart is the centre of emotion (2 Cor 2,4; Rom 9,2, cf. Ps 83,3b LXX), intellect (Rom 1,21), desire (Rom 1,24), planning (1 Cor 4,5) and deciding (1 Cor 7,37). Therefore the heart can be named as the entity to which God sent his spirit (Gal 4,6) in order to give us knowledge (2 Cor 4,6). For a Greco-Roman reader the heart functions as ἡγεμονικόν[73].

[69] DUNN, *The Theology of Paul's Letter to the Galatians*, (n. 51), p. 107.

[70] *Plut Socrat* 588E (PLUTARCH, *De genio Socratis*, eds. DE LACY – EINARSON [n. 56], p. 452).

[71] Cf. 4Q416 Frg. 2 c. ii,6: "Do not embitter your holy spirit".

[72] *Epict Diss.* 2,8,11ff (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER [n. 23], p. 260-262).

[73] *Tert anima* 15,4 (TERTULLIAN, *De anima*, ed. J.H. WASZINK [CC SL, 2], Turnhout, Brepols, 1954, pp. 779-869, esp. 801). – There is only a weak parallel in the description of the physiological function of the heart according to *Plato Tim.* 70B (PLATO, *Timaeus*, in *Plato*, ed. BURY [n. 4], p. 180-182): Its reaction on unjust actions from without or even from the interior desires should allow, that the reason remains the leader of all the organs also in time of passion.

Positively named aspects can be compared with the Stoic doctrine concerning the permitted emotions like χαρά (Phil 2,2) etc.[74] A Greek reader might have been astonished that desire (Phil 1,23) and wrath (Gal 5,12) are mentioned positively – Tertullian held it noteworthy enough to remark on the fact.[75]

2.3.4. The Human Mind

According to Rom 12,2, we should be able to discern what is the will of God by our renewed mind. The syntagma "will of God" is circumscribed with the wording "what is good and acceptable and perfect". This is as abstract in formulation as Phil 4,8: "whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is pleasing, whatever is commendable, if there is any excellence and if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things". But these abstract wordings can be given content by the phrases in which Paul admonishes the Christians to find out what to do and what to avoid. Paul can use the verbs δοκιμάζειν, κρίνειν and λογίζεσθαι.[76]

Some scholars describing Paul's ethics correctly entitled it an ethics of freedom,[77] but in my view this title can be misleading: In contrast to Gal 5,1.13, in Romans the term ἐλευθερία is reduced[78] to mean the freedom from sin. It does not entail our modern concept of freedom to decide according to the norms that we are free to choose. Yet we can see an analogy between Pauline and Stoic thinking at one point: Only the wise

[74] *Diog Laert* 7,116 (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers in Two Volumes*, with an English Translation, ed. R.D. HICKS, London 1925 = 1966, p. 220).

[75] *Tert anima* 16,6 (TERTULLIAN, *De anima*, ed. WASZINK [n. 73], p. 803) referring to 1 Tim 3,1 and Gal 5,12. According to CYRILL OF ALEXANDRIA, *In Lucam*, (PG 72, 475 A – 959 C; p. 921 D), Jesus' fear in Gethsemane proves that there are πάθη which belong to human existence but that are not to be reconsidered as sin.

[76] U. SCHNELLE, *Die Begründung und die Gestaltung der Ethik bei Paulus*, in R. GEBAUER u.a. (eds.), *Die bleibende Gegenwart des Evangeliums, Festschrift O. Merk* (Marburger Theologische Studien, 76), Marburg, Elwert, 2003, pp. 109-131, esp. 127, refers to the parallel use of these verbs in Greek philosophy.

[77] Cf. H.D. BETZ, *Der Mensch in seinen Antagonismen aus der Sicht des Paulus*, in J. BEUTLER (ed.), *Der neue Mensch* (n. 15), pp. 39-56, esp. 52-53. For more on the theme "freedom according to Paul" see F. ST. JONES, *"Freiheit" in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus. Eine historische, exegetische und religionshistorische Studie* (Göttinger Theologische Arbeiten, 34), Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987; S. VOLLENWEIDER, *Freiheit als neue Schöpfung. Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt* (FRLANT, 147), Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989.

[78] Cf. G. DAUTZENBERG, *Freiheit im hellenistischen Kontext*, in BEUTLER (ed.), *Der neue Mensch* (n. 15), pp. 57-81, esp. 78.

man is free, and, according to Epictetus, this freedom is realized when the desires are absent;[79] similarly freedom from sin is one of the characteristics of Christian life. The term δουλεύειν for a good life under the rule of a goddess occurs in Greco-Roman literature as well: The δουλεία under Isis is the beginning of a new and happy life.[80]

Pauline ethics can be called reflected ethics of correspondence to God's will. Actually in the concrete situation we have to decide which possibility of our acting fulfills this claim of correspondence. Some of these occurrences are formulated in an unspecific way. What it means to be dead for sin (Rom 6,11) or to determine what is best (Phil 1,10!) is to be found only within the situation in which we have to decide what to do or not. The confession of Paul in Phil 3,13 has to be understood similarly. The lists of virtues like Gal 5,22s also are only giving the point of orientation, similarly 1 Cor 2,16b: ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν.

But in other cases only one result is the proper one: "Never to put a stumbling block or hindrance in the way of another" (Rom 14,13) means in the context of Rom 14–15 to abstain from eating in liberty. 1 Cor 10,1-22 discusses whether the Christians should participate in pagan worship or not. κρίνατε ὑμεῖς ὅ φημι (1 Cor 10,15) is the exhortation to draw the appropriate consequences implied by the forbidding of foreign gods in the Decalogue. According to 1 Cor 11,28, the Corinthians should realize that the celebration of the common meal according to its original meaning also has social consequences. In 2 Cor 5,14s, the conviction of Jesus' death "for all" implies that "all have died" and should live no longer for themselves, but for him who died and was raised for them. According to 2 Cor 13,5, the Corinthians should judge themselves and avoid the vices mentioned in 2 Cor 12,20. The well-known phrase Phil 2,12-13 also has to be mentioned here. This is an anthropological phrase, not in a narrow sense but with a general meaning: The community, not the individual, is admonished to make salvation perfect; fear and trembling are the proper human reactions to God's deeds (Jer 5,21; Jes 41,23). Obedience to the apostle's admonition mentioned in Phil 2,1-4 *is* the proper way (v. 12a).

Therefore, I prefer a more precise solution. In some specified situations, only one possibility of decision is adequate to the will of God (e.g.,

[79] EPICTETUS, *Diss.* 4,1,23 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER [n. 6], p. 250).

[80] *Apul Metam* 11,15,4-5 (APULEIUS, *Metamorphoses in Two Volumes*, Vol 2, ed. and transl., ed. J.A. HANSON (LCL, 453), Cambridge, MA, London, Harvard University Press, 1989, p. 320), quoted by DAUTZENBERG, *Freiheit* (n. 78), p. 79 n. 87.

concerning the problem of idolatry). In other situations the Christian mind should seek for the maximum of conformity to God's will.[81]

2.3.5. The Conscience

In the Old Testament, we do not have one single equivalent for "conscience". The function of "conscience" is implied in the Old Testament's use of "heart".[82] In early Judaism, the word "conscience" occurs in Wis 17,11: "wickedness is a cowardly thing, condemned by its own testimony; distressed by conscience, it has always exaggerated the difficulties". Paul uses the word in order to make a distinction between the heart as the centre of motivation before the deed and the conscience as an authority of judging either the planned or the actually done deed in relation to the presupposed norm, as Hans-Joachim Eckstein has shown.[83] The judgement of our own conscience testifies that God's truth is well-known to us;[84] yet it is not identical with God's last judgement. "I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted. It is the Lord who judges me" (1 Cor 4,4). To be sure, Paul had a robust conscience,[85] yet he also applies his consciousness of the last judgement to himself, cf. Phil 3,13 ("I do not consider that I have made it my own").

Συνείδησις is not only the testing of one's own deeds but also the judgement concerning the behaviour of other people – the conscience of my neighbour can be violated by my deeds. In the Christian community, one person is responsible for the other because of winning or loosing the eternal σωτηρία. Paul himself observes this rule for his own missionary activity: "we commend ourselves to the conscience of everyone in the sight of God" (2 Cor 4,2); "Therefore, knowing the fear of the Lord, we try to persuade others; but we ourselves are well known to God, and I

[81] Cf. B. ROSNER, *Paul's Ethics*, in J.D.G. DUNN (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to St. Paul*, Cambridge, Cambride University Press, 2003, pp. 212-223, esp. 218: "Total dedication to God is not some after thought, but the climax to which Paul has been building".

[82] Cf. 2 Sam 24,10: After having counted the people, "David was stricken to the heart".

[83] H.-J. ECKSTEIN, *Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus* (WUNT, II.10), Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1983, pp. 178-179.

[84] G. BORNKAMM, *Paulus* (Urban Taschenbücher, 199), Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 3rd. edn. 1977, p. 142.

[85] K. STENDAHL, *The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West*, in *HTR* 56 (1963) 199-215, esp. 206-207.

hope that we are also well known to your consciences" (2 Cor 5,11). As an apostle he is responsible for his churches in the last judgement: "I feel a divine jealousy for you, for I promised you in marriage to one husband, to present you as a chaste virgin to Christ" (2 Cor 11,2; cf. 2 Cor 11,28). Paul sees himself responsible as a father (cf. 1 Cor 4,14) and a mother (Gal 4,19) to care for the best of the churches and does not quote Ezek 3,19: "if you warn the wicked, and they do not turn from their wickedness, or from their wicked way, they shall die for their iniquity; but you will have saved your life". The quoted phrases of 2 Cor are not mere rhetorical trickery to conceal the weakness of Paul's arguments but point to an obligation deeply felt by Paul himself.

3. Anthropology and Christian Ethics

3.1. Human Beings as Sinners

In Rom 1–2, pagan behaviour is described on the basis of Jewish apologetic literature (cf. 1 Thess 4,1-8). The following chain is presupposed: paganism *is* ignorance of God *is* stupidity *is* ethical failure. The pagans could have knowledge of God but they fail to acknowledge God. Therefore, they are handed over to their desires and cannot liberate themselves from their power. Their conscience accusing them of their bad deeds could be understood as a call to repentance, but they do not follow this call. They do not realise the relation between the knowledge of God, knowledge of nature, and ethical behaviour attested in Stoic literature and in *1 En* 41,5 as well. In Rom 2,17-24, the Jewish behaviour is characterised as a possible (! εἰ; Rom 2,17) contradiction between word and deed, in an improper way, as I personally think. Rom 2,17-24 gave rise to Sanders' famous formula "from solution to plight",[86] but this formula is an oversimplification. To be sure, the pre-Christian Paul did not regard himself as a sinner (Phil 3,6; Gal 1,13-14). But the Christian Paul confesses: "I do not consider that I have made it my own" (Phil 3,13). I suggest that Paul after his calling (Gal 1,15-16) read some Biblical texts in a new way (cf. the often under-estimated catena Rom 3,10-18) and by re-reading Gen 3 he recognised the general human tendency to oppose the commands of God (cf. Rom 7,7-13). Human beings are not able to escape this situation of opposing by their own capacities. The power of

[86] E.P. SANDERS, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion*, London, SCM Press, 1977, pp. 178-179.

sin within the sinner is so mighty that the good will concerning the Law is ineffective because of human opposition. This inability is not to be cured by the formation of habits directed against our bad disposition[87] or by the χρῆσις of my νοῦς as in Epictetus.[88] The human mind is not a better part within humans enabling them to a life in accordance with the good.[89]

Yet Paul's view has, as it is widely acknowledged, its parallels in Euripides: "I recognize the cruel I shall do, but my wrath is more powerful than rational thinking".[90] Origen's exegesis of Rom 7,22-23[91] demonstrates how a Greco-Roman reader filled the gaps of philosophical terminology within Paul's letter: The "I", the human will and his προαίρεσις, consents to the will of God, but the ἄσκησις is missing. The προαίρεσις is the ability for free decision;[92] the underlining of the importance of ἄσκησις has its parallels in the writings of, e.g., Musonius Rufus and Epictetus.[93]

Sometimes the Pauline concept of human will without liberty is contrasted to the general Jewish concept of free will grounded in Deut 30,15-18 and repeated in Sir 15,11-17:[94]

> Do not say, "It was the Lord's doing that I fell away"; for he does not do what he hates. Do not say, "It was he who led me astray"; for he has no need of the sinful. The Lord hates all abominations; such things are not loved by those who fear him. It was he who created humankind in the beginning, and he left them in the power of their own free choice. If you choose, you can keep the commandments, and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice. He has placed before you fire

[87] This was the thesis of the school of Anniceris, cf. *Diog Laert* 2,96 ((DIOGENES LAERTIUS, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ed. R.D. HICKS, Vol. 1, London 1925 = 1965, p. 224).

[88] *Epict Diss* 2,26,4 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER [n. 23], p. 432).

[89] BORNKAMM, *Paulus* (n. 84), p. 143.

[90] *Eurip Medea* 1079s (EURIPIDES, *Medea*, ed. D. KOVACS [LCL, 12], Cambridge, MA, London, Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 395). Cf. the exhaustive study of R. v. BENDEMANN, *Die kritische Diastase von Wissen, Wollen und Handeln - Traditionsgeschichtliche Spurensuche eines hellenistischen Topos in Römer 7*, in *ZNW* 95 (2004) 35-63, referring also to the differences between Euripides and his later successors, namely Seneca.

[91] *Origen Comm Rom.* 6,9, (ORIGENES, *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos*, ed. TH. HEITHER, Vol. 3 [FC 2.3], Freiburg u.a., Herder, 1993, p. 276-278).

[92] *Epict Diss* 4,1,1 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER [n. 6], p. 244).

[93] *Musonius Rufus Diss.* 6 (C. MUSONI RUFI Reliquiae, ed. O. HENSE, Leipzig, Teubner, 1905, p. 22-27); *Epict Ench* 49 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER [n. 6], p. 532).

[94] T. LAATO, *Paulus und das Judentum. Anthropologische Erwägungen*, Abo, Abo Akad. Förlag, 1991, p. 183.

> and water; stretch out your hand for whichever you choose. Before each person are life and death, and whichever one chooses will be given.

In Paul's writings, only the Christian is free; humankind before Christ was not free to decide but was enslaved by the power of sin. But there is no discrepancy between Paul and Ben Sira: The latter's statement is to be referred to "staying in"; Paul's description of humankind in Rom 7 is to be referred to the not yet attained "getting in".[95] The parallel 1QH 12,29-32 is mentioned above.[96] In Patristic exegesis, this is combined with the following distinction: Justification is the gift of Christ, but *we* have to live in accordance with this justification given *sola gratia*[97]. Therefore, there is no discrepancy between Rom 3,28 ("getting in") and Jas 2,20 ("staying in") in the eyes of Patristic exegetes.

3.2. Being a Christian: A Thoroughgoing Obligation

Perhaps the Greco-Roman reader would be astonished in reading some positive occurrences of σῶμα in the letters of Paul. These occurrences in 1 Cor 6,19s and in Rom 12,2 underline the claim of Christian faith to rule human life in all its facets, and they imply a closeness between philosophy and Paul concerning the body. Desires should not distract attention from the all-important goal: to be perfect in virtue and in fulfilling God's will. But this overall similarity should not lead us to overlook the differences in detail. The intention of the sometimes passionately praised holistic anthropology is the responsibility throughout the whole of life for all of the facets of my person. According to 1 Cor 6,14-15 our σῶμα belongs to Jesus Christ, and we shall be resurrected, as Jesus Christ is resurrected from the death, and therefore we should not sin by it! To be sure: the body of my resurrection is a new, spiritual σῶμα (1 Cor 15,47), but it is *my* σῶμα, and therefore sinning is not allowed for me. My body has no value in itself, but I am obliged to do God's will in all the dimensions of

[95] Cf. SANDERS, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (n. 86), p. 17.

[96] Cf. Hermas, *Mand.* 12,4-6 (46,4-6). It is a wrong opinion to think that human beings cannot obey God's commands.

[97] JOHANNES CHRYSOSTOMUS, *Homiliae in epistolam ad Romanos* (PG 60, pp. 291–682, p. 446); THEODORET VON CYRUS, *Interpretatio epistolae ad Romanos* (PG 82, pp. 44C–226C, p. 85 B); *Beda Venerabilis In Ias.* 2,20 (BEDA VENERABILIS, *In Epistolas septem Catholicas*, eds. M.L.W. LAISTNER, D. HURST [CC SL, 121], Turnhout, Brepols, 1983, pp. 179-342, esp. 199); cf. *Augustin diversis quaestionibus* 76,2 (AUGUSTIN, *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, ed. A. MUTZENBECHER [CC SL, 44], Turnhout, Brepols, 1970, p. 220).

my human environment including my body. According to Philo, it is the specific challenge of the soul to be a house for God,[98] and therefore the desires of the body are to be controlled. Paul would not attack Philo because of this but his formulation is sharper in order to stress the thoroughgoing obligation. In the two positive occurrences of σῶμα named above, a concept of holiness has to be remarked in 1 Cor 6,19 and in Rom 12,2. A Greco-Roman reader would have had his own notion as well, viewing the *fanum* as an endangered area, endangered by misbehaviour, which is to be kept clean in every way. This concept of holiness is probably to be distinguished from Paul's concept, but these differences of cultural background between Paul and his readers would not hinder a general understanding of Paul's parenetic message.

This is the anthropological obverse of the hermeneutic key for Pauline and Biblical ethics. In Greek philosophy, the ideal of ἐγκράτεια, originally the ongoing self-control, does not prevent the philosopher from being sexually active outside the boundaries of marriage. It does not restrict the freedom of decision. Musonius Rufus holds up one, but not the only possible, position. For the Greek philosopher, the rules for ethical behaviour are grounded in his own insight on virtue and vice, for the Jew or Christian these rules are grounded in the word of God. Μὴ ἐπιθυμήσεις is a human philosophical insight in Diogenes Laertios but in the Bible (Ex 20,17), it is the command of God. The admonitions given by the philosopher have their basis in the call to use the mind, but Paul says: let your mind be renewed and then use it (Rom 12,2).

To be sure, in early Jewish ethical literature we also find rational arguments and only seldom Biblical commands. However, these are embedded in the general framework of the Law of God, not primarily as a compendium of material commands but as the principal idea to form men's life (cf. Bar 4,4: "Blessed are we, Israel, because we know what is pleasing to God"). Paul's exhortation in Rom 12,2 to ascertain God's will is not a free decision but the convergence of one's νοῦς with the will of God. This difference between philosophical and Biblical grounding of exhortations is well known to the ancient critics of Christianity.[99]

[98] *Philo somn* 1,149 (in PHILO, *De somniis*, with an English Translation, ed. F.H. COLSON – G.H. WHITAKER, Vol. 5, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 1934 = 1968, 283-579, p. 376); *Philo sobr* 62 (in PHILO, *De sobrietate* with an English Translation, ed. F.H. COLSON – G.H. WHITAKER, Vol. 3, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1930 = 1968, p. 476).

[99] Cf. *Tert apol* 46,2 (TERTULLIAN, *Apologeticum*, ed. F. DEKKERS [CC SL, 1], Turnhout, Brepols, 1954, pp. 77-171, esp. 160); GALEN (R. WALZER, *Galenos*, RAC 8 [1972], pp. 777-786, esp. 782).

But it is not only possible to juxtapose parallels in single claims and differences in motivation.[100] We can read the Pauline words as part of a discussion cited, e.g., in Seneca's writings:[101] "The question has often been raised, whether it is better to have moderate emotions, or none at all: Philosophers of our (*sc.* Stoic) school[102] reject the emotions; the Peripatetics keep them in check". Seneca does not fail to quote the Peripatetic objections against the Stoics:

> Your promises are too great, and your counsels too hard. We are mere manikins, unable to deny ourselves everything. We shall sorrow, but not to any great extent; we shall feel desires, but in moderation; we shall give way to anger, but we shall be appeased.

Seneca responds:[103]

> And do you know why we have not the power to attain this Stoic ideal? It is because we refuse to believe in our power. Nay, of a surety, there is something else which plays a part: it is because we are in love with our vices; we uphold them and prefer to make excuses for them rather than shake them off. We mortals have been endowed with sufficient strength by nature, if only we use this strength, if only we concentrate our powers and rouse them all to help us or at least not to hinder us. The reason is unwillingness, the excuse, inability.

Christian and Stoic claims concerning the orientation of the whole of life were in similar way radical. The ideal of perfection, mentioned in Rom 12,2, is a hint, I believe, that Paul would have preferred the severe Stoic position in contrast to the Peripatetic critique, if he had been familiar with this discussion. Christian radicalism in avoiding sins has its parallels in the harsh Stoic thesis that there is no third alternative between being wise and being foolish. "The wise are infallible, not being liable to error" (ἔτι καὶ ἀναμαρτήτους, τῷ ἀπεριπτώτους εἶναι ἁμαρτήματι).[104] According to

[100] Cf. *Philo Decal* 173 (PHILO, *De decalogo*, with an English Translation, ed. F.H. COLSON, Vol. 7, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1937 = 1968, pp. 1-95, pp. 90-92).

[101] *Sen Ep. moral.* 116,1 (SENECA, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales in Three Volumes*, ed. R.M. GUMMERE, Vol. 3, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1920 = 1962, 333).

[102] Cf. *Horat Serm.* 2,7,85 (Q. HORATI FLACCI *opera*, Vol. 2, rec. D. BO [Corpus Scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum] Turin u.a., Paravia, 1959, p. 151), who formulates the Stoic ideal: *responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores fortis.*

[103] SENECA, *Ep. moral.* 116,7s, ed. GUMMERE (n. 101), p. 337.

[104] *Diog Laert* 7,122 (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ed. HICKS [n. 74], p. 226). *Philo Spec. Leg* 4,95 (PHILO, *De specialibus legibus* with an English Translation, ed. F.H. COLSON, Vol. 8, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1939=1968, pp. 1-155, esp. 66-67s) defines desire as

Rom 12,2, the Christians shall discern what is the will of God – what is good and acceptable and perfect. The word τέλειος is also used in Phil 3,15 to describe the ideal of mature Christian life. To be sure, Paul himself confesses that he has not achieved this goal yet (Phil 3,13). Yet it is his hope that his will to be perfect is a model for some people who declare themselves perfect (Phil 3,16).[105] Neither orthodox protestant scrupulosity nor neo-protestant indifference should hinder us to take serious importance of this ideal of perfection as important for Paul.

4. Emotions

The exhortation to ascertain "what is the will of God, the good, and acceptable, and perfect" (Rom 12,2), is clarified twice within the Pauline letters. In Gal 5,24, he writes: "And those who belong to Christ Jesus have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires". Cf. Rom 8,13b: "if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live".[106]

A Greco-Roman reader could in general remark that Christian theology regarded pre-Christian life as life subjugated to the passions in parallel to the philosophical view concerning the life of the uneducated masses. He could agree with the main thesis that true life implies the control of the passions[107] yet miss not only some terms[108] but also any elaborated

"battery of destruction to the soul which must be done away with or brought into obedience to the governance of reason". Probably he knew of this discussion but did not intend a clear decision; cf. P. VON GEMÜNDEN, *Die christliche Taufe und der Umgang mit den Affekten*, in J. ASSMANN – G.G. STROUMSA (eds.), *Transformation of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions* (Studies in the History of Religions, Numen Book Series, 83), Leiden et al., Brill, 1999, pp. 115-136, esp. 123.

[105] The term τέλειος is not used ironically in my view. Correctly, P. O'BRIEN, *The Epistle to the Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, Grand Rapdis, MI, Eerdmans, 1991, p. 436, and G. FEE, *Paul's Letter to the Philippians*, NICNT, Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 1995, p. 335.

[106] Cf. Rom 13,14.

[107] This control leads to release and separation of the soul from the body in the complete life, and this is in general the aim of the philosophers, cf. *Plato Phaid* 67D (PLATO, *Phaidon*, ed. FOWLER [n. 10], p. 234). According to *Musonius Rufus Diss* 17 (C. MUSONI RUFI Reliquiae, ed. O. HENSE, [n. 92], p. 90), human beings are the μίημα of God by following virtue, not lust. – Eternal life in the view of the Greco-Roman Christian author Theodoret of Cyrus is free from all emotions, cf. THEODORET OF CYRUS, *in Jeremiae Prophetiam Interpretatio*, PG 81, pp. 495 A – 760 B, here p. 668 B: τῶν παθῶν πεπαυμένων.

[108] The Stoic doctrine of the emotions names λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, and ἡδονή as main passions; cf. *Diog Laert* 7,92 (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ed. HICKS [n. 74] p. 198). Permitted emotions are χαρά, εὐλάβεια, and βούλησις (see below). The words ἡδονή, εὐλάβεια and βούλησις are missing from Paul's writings.

theory on the topic.[109] Paul does not treat this theme of control on the level of general human experience in order to help the Christians to live according to God's will.[110] Yet this remark is no exhaustive treatment of the topic. We have to be careful concerning Paul but also concerning the Greco-Roman world: The protreptic warning against the rule of passions is only one topic of ancient reflection on this theme. Even the word "desire" can be used in a positive way to describe the philosopher's or the apostle's wish to die.[111] On the other hand, Paul's letters also deal with processes of communication between the members of Christian communities and between these communities and the apostle himself. These themes are not very often disputed in Greco-Roman philosophical literature.

4.1. Grief

λύπη is regarded as constraining even Christian life because of premature death (1 Thess 4,13). Grief over the death of a beloved person is a common topic in Greco-Roman grave inscriptions, but a Stoic philosopher would stress the improper mentality of both the apostle and the Thessalonians: it is not death itself that is evil, but our wrong opinion about it.[112]

If beloved persons act in a wrong way, the love for them causes grief (2 Cor 2,1-4; Rom 9,2; cf. *EpPolyc* 11,1). It would be useful to find parallels in ancient friendship literature[113] – this issue naturally does not

[109] For the possible Jewish adaption of such a theory, see Philo and 4 Macc 1; 2. P. VON GEMÜNDEN, *Der Affekt der* ἐπιθυμία *und der* νόμος. *Affektkontrolle und soziale Identitätsbildung im 4. Makkabäerbuch mit einem Ausblick auf den Römerbrief*, in D. SÄNGER – M. KONRADT (eds.), *Das Gesetz im frühen Judentum und im Neuen Testament*, Festschrift C. Burchard (NTOA, 57), Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Fribourg, Academic Press Fribourg, 2006, pp. 55-74, esp. 67-68, underlines the coherence between the control of passions and affirming Jewish identity.

[110] *Sen Ep moral* 85,15 (SENECA, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, ed. R.M. GUMMERE, Vol. 2, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1920 = 1962, p. 293) explains, that an emotion like fear "if is once given an entrance will by frequent use pass over into a vice". But cf. R. GEBAUER, *Paulus als Seelsorger. Ein exegetischer Beitrag zur Praktischen Theologie* (Calwer Theologische Monographien, A 18), Stuttgart, Calwer Verlag, 1997.

[111] Cf. *Plato Phaid* 67E (PLATO, *Phaidon*, ed. FOWLER [n. 10], p. 234), with Phil 1,23.

[112] MUSONIUS RUFUS, *Diss.* 17 (C. MUSONI RUFI Reliquiae, ed. HENSE [n. 92], p. 92); *Epict Diss* 3,22,21 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER [n. 6], p. 136).

[113] *Hieronymus In Gal. 3*, (HIERONYMUS, *Commentariorum*, ed. RASPANTI [n. 9], p. 131) interprets Gal 4,19a (τέκνα μου ὡς πάλιν ὠδίνω) as grief of the teacher in behalf of his pupils.

arise in writings defining friendship as a relation possible only between wise men who never decline from the path of wisdom. A Greek philosopher could ask why Paul does not more often choose the strategy of persuading by his own example. Paul's claim to authority could remind him of the behaviour of the master of a philosophic school threatened by imminent secession. Admittedly, such parallels are hard to find, but this is understandable: some sorts of inner-school problems and actions are not very well documented in the surviving literature.

If beloved persons, vituperated because of their wrong behaviour, fall into grief and then correct their behaviour, then this grief is a κατὰ θεὸν λύπη, to be distinguished from the grief of this world (2 Cor 7,9-11). A later Greco-Roman reader can be reminded of Plutarch's remark that "the other pangs reason does away with, but regret is caused by reason itself, since the soul, together with its feeling of shame, is stung and chastised by itself".[114] This grief can be understood as process of reflection guiding the sinner on the right way.

According to Paul, within the Christian community one should not provoke another's grief (Rom 14,13). A Greco-Roman reader would realize that this admonition does not deal only with an emotion which should be avoided by Christians in general but with a severe problem of Christian life together. A general parallel is to be seen in Lucian's bitter mockery of philosophers who by their behaviour draw shame on the name of philosophy.[115]

4.2. Fear

If we compare the works of, e.g., Epictetus and the letters of Paul, we can remark that fear is more frequently mentioned in the works of the former. This is explained by the different addressees of Epictetus and Paul. Epictetus has in mind individuals for whom the loss of wealth, career, home and honour was a real possibility. For the Pauline audiences these themes were not very important (cf. 1 Cor 1,26-31).[116]

[114] *Plut Tranqu. An.* 19,476-477 (PLUTARCH, *De tranquillitate animi*, in *Plutarch's Moralia in 15 Volumes*, Vol. 6, with an English Translation by W.C. HELMBOLD, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. 161-241, esp. 234-36).

[115] *Lucian Piscator* (LUCIAN, *Reviviscentes sive Piscator*, in *Lucian in Eight Volumes*, Vol. 3, with an English Translation, ed. A.M. HARMON, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, London, William Heinemann, 1921 = 1960, pp. 1-81).

[116] *Epict Diss* 1,9,6 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER [n. 23], p. 64); cf. *Diss.* 4,1,33-53 (EPICTETUS, *The Discourses*, ed. OLDFATHER [n. 6], p. 252-260).

Within the Pauline writings, φόβος can be regarded as possibly constraining even Christian life (Rom 8,15). Yet φόβος is not to be avoided since, related to God, it is a Biblically grounded virtue (Prov 1,7; cf. 2 Cor 7,11). It is the adequate reaction to God's deed of calling the Christians (Phil 2,13-14) and the appropriate attitude in regard to the last judgement (2 Cor 5,11). A Greco-Roman reader could perhaps be reminded here of Plato's remark concerning the necessity of fear in education,[117] but would probably regard it as confirming his prejudice against Christianity as a movement of the uneducated masses.[118] The real wisdom would be to do good for goodness' sake, not because of the fear of a god.

Paul's own fear concerning the congregations in Corinth (2 Cor 12,20) and Galatia (Gal 4,11) is real fear but it also functions as a rhetorical device: The addressees should listen to him.

4.3. Desire

Although desire is the emotion with the most references in Paul, we do not have an anthropological theory even here. Picking up a well-known ancient topic about the motivation to do a distinct deed just because this deed is forbidden,[119] Paul maintains that the Biblical prohibition of desire (Ex 20,17) invokes it but he does not explain why this mechanism functions at all. According to Theodore of Mopsuestia, the mortality of human beings is the driver for their desires.[120] This theory is perhaps not cogent, but it is a possible explanation.[121] The sole contribution given by Paul is the remark that the expression "delivered to the desires" (Rom 1,24) refers to their enslaving nature.[122] Concerning Gal 5,17 we have to question whether the desiring of the flesh against the Spirit is the experience

[117] *Plato Leg* 11, 927 AB (PLATO, *Laws*, in *Plato in 12 Volumes*, with an English Translation by R.G. DURY, vol. 2, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1926 = 1968, p. 434).

[118] Cf. *Origen Cels* 3,44,50 (CELSUS, ed. M. BORRET, vol. 2 [SC, 136], Paris, Cerf, 1968, p. 104).

[119] VON GEMÜNDEN, *Der Affekt* (n. 109), p. 70; p. 118.

[120] *Theodor of Mopsuestia Gal.* (THEODOR OF MOPSUESTIA, *In epistolas b. Pauli commentarii, the Latin version with the Greek fragments in 2 Volumes* with an Introduction, Notes and Indices, ed. H.B. SWETE, Cambridge 1880–1882, vol. 2, pp. 25–31).

[121] Cf. D. ZELLER, *Charis bei Philon und Paulus* (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien, 142), Stuttgart, Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1990, p. 162, explains the mechanism of Biblical prohibition and human objection: The last commandment of the decalogue seems, though given for life, to withhold this life from the desiring man.

[122] Cf. 1 Tim 6,9.

of Christians[123] or of non-Christians from a Christian point of view. To be sure, Rom 8 describes the life of Christians in another way, and therefore one could prefer the later interpretation. On the other hand, the thoroughgoing admonition is an obstacle to this. Gal 5,17 names a danger existent also for Christians, the danger that the flesh overcomes God's spirit within us.[124] In my view, Paul underlines the necessity of total orientation toward the Spirit;[125] only in this case does the good will within us attain its fulfilment.[126]

A Greco-Roman reader of Paul's epistles would perhaps notice something of the predominant presence of the theme of ἐπιθυμία; other vices are not so often mentioned in the Pauline writings. Various reasons can be given for this.

1. Fear concerning the loss of career etc. (see above) is not the main problem for Paul's audience.
2. Paul is not alone in regard to the dominance of desire – according to Philo ἐπιθυμία is the worst of all vices.[127]
3. Paul's desire to meet the Christian community in Thessalonica (1 Thess 2,17) is a topic of friendship literature, but it is no virtue,[128] just – desire.
4. To be "delivered to the desires" is typical for the Gentiles (Rom 1,24, but cf. 1 Thess 4,5), who have a knowledge of God but do not pay the homage due to him and therefore are turned to folly (Rom 1,21-23). Here Paul shares the common style of early Jewish self-definition in contrast to the Gentiles. For his addressees this harsh self-definition also functions as a boundary to prevent them from falling back into the life of their non-Christian past.
5. Despite this Jewish opinion concerning the Gentiles, there is a great convergence between philosophical and Biblical ethics concerning

[123] DUNN, *Theology of Galatians* (n. 51), p. 109.

[124] VON GEMÜNDEN, *Die christliche Taufe und der Umgang mit den Affekten* (n. 104), p. 130.

[125] H. LÖHR, *Paulus und der Wille zur Tat. Beobachtungen zu einer frühchristlichen Theologie als Anweisung zur Lebenskunst*, in *ZNW* 98 (2007) 165-188, pp. 177-179, is right in his interpretation.

[126] The concluding words ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε are to be referred to both good and bad willing.

[127] *Philo Decal* 142 (PHILO, *De decalogo*, ed. COLSON [n. 100], p. 76); cf. ZELLER, *Charis* (n. 121), p. 161.

[128] A phrase like Gen 49,14 (Ἰσσαχαρ τὸ καλὸν ἐπεθύημσεν) is missing from Paul's letters.

the desire, the ἐπιθυμία. This πάθος is a subordinated vice in Peripatetic and a primary vice in Stoic[129] literature, and also forbidden in Biblical tradition. Ex 20,17 begins: μὴ ἐπιθυμήσεις, and in early Jewish literature these two opening words function as a general prohibition of all desire.[130] We have to add a Biblical example of desire as a struggle against God: In 1 Cor 10,6, Paul alludes to Num 11,4.34.[131]

4.4. Joy

Plato did not use the word χαρά in order to distinguish an emotion which does not fall under the verdict of being a wrong affection, but he distinguishes the true and pure pleasures from the pleasures which follow after folly. The former ones are connected to health and self-restraint, and they are called the handmaids of virtue.[132] The Cyrenaic philosopher Theodorus "considered joy and grief to be the supreme good and evil, the one brought about by wisdom, the other by folly".[133] Stoic doctrine makes a terminological distinction between joy and pleasure: "Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation".[134] According to Seneca, true joy is possible only for wise men; for joy is the "elation of spirit – of a spirit which trusts in the goodness and truth of its own possessions".[135] Virtue alone affords "everlasting and peace-giving joy";[136] and joy "comes from a good conscience, from honourable purposes, from right actions, from contempt of the gifts of chance, from an even and calm way of living which treads but one path".[137] Real joy is a stern matter: to despise

[129] *Diog Laert* 7,113 (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ed. HICKS [n. 74], p. 218).

[130] *ApMos* 19,3; 4 Macc 2,6.

[131] The evaluation of people's desire as ἐπιθυμία κακῶν in 1 Cor 10,6 has no terminological counterpart in Num 11 but Paul's allusion is due to the mention of God's wrath in Num 11,10.

[132] *Plato Phileb* 63E/64A (PLATO, *Philebus*, in *Plato in 12 Volumes*, Vol. 8, with an English Translation, ed. H.N. FOWLER – R.M. LAMB, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, London, William Heinemann, 1925 = 1975, pp. 197-399, p. 386).

[133] *Diog Laert* 2,98 (DIOGENES LAERTIUS, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ed. HICKS [n. 87]. p. 227).

[134] *Diog Laert* 7,116 (ed. HICKS [n. 74], p. 221).

[135] *Sen Ep moral* 59,2 (SENECA, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales in Three Volumes*, ed. R.M. GUMMERE, Vol. 1, LCL, London, William Heinemann, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1917 = 1967, p. 411).

[136] *Sen Ep moral* 27,3 (SENECA, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, ed. GUMMERE [n. 135], p. 195).

[137] *Sen Ep moral*, 23,7 (ed. GUMMERE [n. 135], p. 163).

death, to open the door to poverty, to hold the curb on pleasures, or to contemplate the endurance of pain.[138]

In the Pauline writings, joy is not a profane emotion at all. Christian joy is the consequence of the certainty of being saved by God's deed in Jesus Christ (1 Thess 1,6) that will be finally realized at the last judgement (Rom 12,12). Therefore the word joy can be combined with the word hope (Rom 12,12) and be named as a gift of the Kingdom of God (Rom 14,17). The exhortation to rejoice (2 Cor 13,11; Phil 3,1; 4,4) is a reminder of this basic fact within Christian life. In this certainty, the Christian can bear θλίψεις (2 Cor 6,10; 7,4-6), similarly as according to Seneca real joy for the wise man is a stern matter. This Christian certainty also involves a distance from this world (1 Cor 7,30), and the authentic joy is a fruit of the Holy Spirit (Gal 5,22) in contrast to the works of the flesh (Gal 5,19-21). This combination of gladness and hope (Rom 12,12; 15,13) is reminiscent of Cicero's estimation of the mystery cults which could be regarded as means of humanizing the masses in the ancient world.[139]

One of the basic definitions of a truly philosophical life is the application of a philosophical dogma in daily life. Concerning the topic of joy we can study not only Paul's exhortations but also his own practice. For Paul, joy is the consequence of the proclaiming of Christ (Phil 1,18) and a sign for an unspoilt relation between the apostle and the Christian congregations (1 Thess 2,19s; 2 Cor 2,3; 7,16; Rom 15,32; Phil 2,2; 4,1) and co-workers (1 Cor 16,17). The growth of faith and love in the Christian congregations increases the joy of the apostle (1 Thess 3,9). Profane reasons for joy are not mentioned. So the apostle demonstrates by his own behaviour that the real joy is oriented to the genuine good.

A Greco-Roman reader would miss any philosophical definition but could perhaps be reminded of Seneca's insight that only a wise man can feel real joy.

4.5. Wrath

Aristotle considers wrath[140] as a rhetorical instrument for orators or poets but the Stoics view it in a totally negative way.[141] Ancient discourse on

[138] *Sen Ep. moral.* 23,4 (ed. GUMMERE [n. 135], p. 161).

[139] *Cic De legibus* 2,36 (MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, *De legibus*, ed. K. ZIEGLER, 3rd edn, ed. W. GÖRLER [Heidelberger Texte, 20], Freiburg, Würzburg, Ploetz, 1979, p. 69).

[140] For an exhaustive study concerning wrath in ancient literature cf. P. VON GEMÜNDEN, *La gestion de la colère et de l'agression dans l'antiquité et dans le sermon sur la montagne* in *Henoch* 25 (2003) 19-45.

[141] VON GEMÜNDEN, *La gestion* (n. 140), pp. 21-22. – The Biblical expression "wrath of God" is notoriously difficult and can only be justified as a reaction against severe human failure.

wrath "concerns two aspects: how to deal with one's own anger and how to deal with exposure to someone else's anger or aggression".[142]

Within Pauline writings, human wrath expresses a negative behaviour, whereas zeal is sometimes mentioned in a positive way (2 Cor 11,2). Paul's exhortation in Rom 12,19 is very conventional. But here again we can compare Paul's words with his behaviour. An unknown ancient critic of Christianity attacked Paul because of the wrathfulness he expressed in Gal 5,12: this contradicted his claim that Jesus Christ lived in him (Gal 2,20a) who had given the admonition in Matt 5,44.[143] Jerome tries to defend the apostle: Paul's wrath is a signal of his pain concerning the Galatians.[144]

5. Concluding Hermeneutic Reflections

We have remarked on analogies and discrepancies between Pauline and Greco-Roman philosophical anthropology. The analogies lie in the strength of the moral command, and the analogy between the Pharisaic Paul and the Stoics is not surprising. In Josephus' description of the Pharisees, we also find an affinity with the outline of some Stoic topics.

The difference between Paul and Greek philosophers can be seen in their grounding of ethics: The Greek philosopher advises human beings who are living without philosophical orientation to use their mind; the *extra nos* is the λόγος προτρεπτικός, spoken by the philosopher, but this *extra nos* advises the addressees to use their own intellectual power in order to realise the proper way of life.

Christianity in ancient times could be attractive for people for whom the result for daily life was more important than the way of getting it, and Christianity could be satisfying for those who did not settle for philosophical scepticism when faced by the divergence of opinions concerning cosmogony and ethics, but trusted divine revelation to lead the futile way of purely human searching to a good destination. The absence of specific philosophical terminology changed from being a weakness to a chance for free Christian choosing and rejecting Greco-Roman motives – without it some works like Tertullian's *De anima* or the great ancient Christian anthropology of Nemesius von Emesa (*De natura hominis*) could not have been written.

[142] VON GEMÜNDEN, *La gestion* (n. 140), p. 45.

[143] *Porph Frgm* 37 (PORPHYRUS, *Fragmente*, ed. VON HARNACK [n. 16], p. 63). The origin of this argument is unknown, but in any case it is an argument by a non-Christian.

[144] *Hieron Gal* (HIERONYMUS, *Commentariorum*, ed. RASPANTI [n. 9], pp. 167-168).

On the other side, the exclusive monotheism, the severe ethics and the certainty of Christian faith could possibly cause two negative judgements concerning Christianity. This new religious movement within the Roman Empire was either despised as a movement of a few uneducated people from the lower classes or as a subversive danger for the whole of the intellectual basis. The accusations on murder and incest were substantially wrong; yet, on another level, the impression that Christianity could integrate some aspects of Greco-Roman thinking but not vice versa was correct. The accusations mentioned above testify to the fear of domination by this new movement, just as in our days some people fear the resurgence of Islam as threatening the traditional Christian orientation or the free Western way of life.

In a post-modern situation, it seems less helpful to overemphasize this difference. Perhaps we should formulate it positively: Compelled by dynamics beyond our own thinking, we can do what is right even though we are only human beings. That could be the translation of the Pauline doctrine of the Holy Spirit in a non-religious language. We can do what is right and therefore we should do it. In addition to this, the construction and continual realisation of Christian identity is a way oriented to a higher end, to being perfect. Even Paul declared himself not to be perfect (Phil 3,13).

The closeness of Paul's thinking to some Qumran texts is well attested. Both the Qumran community and Paul's Jesus movement are concentrated on the call of adults to reflect on their life and their decision whether they join the יחד or the church. The addresses of Christian proclamation in our days are baptised but have perhaps no clear judgement on the value of Christianity. Christian proclamation has to help them to re-find their forgotten Christian roots.

Insights from Pauline anthropology can also be applied in another way. Post-modern life is often a life of isolated individual being. Christians remember themselves and others in the light of the obligation to remark the distress of my neighbour, to be merciful. The social antagonisms within the western societies are increasing and many people will judge the value of Christianity by the criterion of social experience and political engagement concerning this challenge. Lists of virtues in Greek philosophy and in Christianity are partially to be distinguished from each other. In the Christian lists, my behaviour over against my neighbour is more important; on the other hand, ἀνδρεία is not mentioned at all in the New Testament. And opposed to the phrase "anything goes", Christians should remember that our well-known post-modern liberty is

actually not a way of life for all humans. Christians have to find the balance between the freedom and tolerance of our modern Western societies and the real binding of conscience from a strict religious point of view which claims decisive authority for other people.

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